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Inflaatiotavoitteeseen sitoutuneet kehittyvät taloudet joutuvat usein tasapainoilemaan tiu-
kan inflaatiotavoitteen (ja täysin kelluvan valuuttakurssin) sekä valuuttakurssin vaihteluita 
tasoittavan "joustavan inflaatiotavoitteen" (ja hallitun kellunnan) välillä. Tässä tutkimuk-
sessa tarkastellaan 37 maan paneeliaineiston perusteella inflaatiotavoitteen ja valuuttakurs-
sin  vaihteluiden  välisiä  yhteyksiä.  Vaikuttaa  siltä,  että  formaali  inflaatiotavoite  johtaa 
suurempaan  valuuttakurssin  vaihteluun  kuin  muut  rahapoliittiset  järjestelmät.  Toisaalta 
selkeän inflaatiotavoitteen asettaneissa maissa keskuspankin interventiot ovat olleet tehok-
kaampia valuuttakurssivaihteluiden tasoittamisessa kuin maissa, jossa inflaatiotavoitetta ei 
ole. Tämän tuloksen voidaan nähdä tukevan "joustavan inflaatiotavoitteen" käyttöä kehit-
tyvissä maissa.  
 
Asiasanat: inflaatiotavoite, valuuttakurssivaihtelut, valuuttamarkkinainterventiot, kehitty-
vät taloudet 
 
 Flexible in°ation targets, forex interventions and
exchange rate volatility in emerging countries¤
Juan Carlos Berganza
Banco de Espa~ na
Carmen Broto
Banco de Espa~ na
March 2011
Abstract
Emerging economies with in°ation targets (IT) face a dilemma between ful¯lling
the theoretical conditions of \strict IT", which implies a fully °exible exchange rate,
or applying a \°exible IT", which entails a de facto managed °oating exchange
rate with forex interventions to moderate exchange rate volatility. Using a panel
data model for 37 countries we ¯nd that, although IT lead to higher exchange
rate instability than alternative regimes, forex interventions in some IT countries
have been more e®ective in reducing volatility than in non-IT countries, which may
justify the use of \°exible IT" by policymakers.
Keywords: In°ation targeting; Exchange rate volatility; Foreign exchange in-
terventions; Emerging economies.
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11 Introduction
Since New Zealand adopted an in°ation target (IT hereafter) in 1990, an increasing num-
ber of countries have implemented this type of monetary policy framework. According to
IMF (2005) and Little and Romano (2009), after Israel adopted its IT in 1997, 18 emerg-
ing countries (EMEs hereafter) have changed their exchange rate regime (from ¯xed to
°oating) and their nominal anchor (from exchange rate to in°ation). See Table 1 for a
summary of IT adoption dates in EMEs. Although the e®ectiveness of IT in lowering
the in°ation level and volatility remains controversial,1 this framework has been more
durable than other monetary policy strategies (Mihov and Rose, 2008). One of the main
reasons for this is that IT countries have bene¯ted from the credibility gains from ex-
plicitly announcing the target, which helped to anchor and lower in°ation expectations
(Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007).2
A °exible nominal exchange rate constitutes, at least from a theoretical standpoint, a
requirement for a well functioning full-°edged IT regime (Mishkin and Savastano, 2001).
Its rationale is based on the policy dilemma of the \impossibility of the Holy Trinity": in
the context of capital mobility, an independent monetary policy cannot be combined with
a ¯xed exchange rate or a peg to another currency via interventions in the foreign exchange
markets (forex interventions hereafter); see Obstfeld et al. (2005). Some economists argue
that one of the costs of IT is precisely the higher volatility of exchange rates as a result of
the °oating exchange rate regime, which may entail negative e®ects of particular relevance
for EMEs, given their greater ¯nancial and real vulnerabilities (Cavoli, 2009). In fact, this
is the basis of the \fear of °oating" (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002), a phenomenon mainly
associated with EMEs.3 Accordingly, during economic booms EMEs also experience
1See Ball and Sheridan (2005) or Brito and Bystedt (2010) for empirical evidence against the positive
role of IT in developed and emerging countries, respectively.
2This e®ect is even stronger in EMEs, as their initial credibility is lower than that of developed
countries (Gon» calves and Salles, 2008).
3According to Cavoli (2009), the main justi¯cations for the \fear of °oating" are: (i) trade contraction
|higher exchange rate volatility will discourage other countries from engaging in trade|; (ii) a higher
pass-through from exchange rate to domestic prices in EMEs than in developed countries; and, (iii)
balance sheet e®ects due to currency mismatches (liability dollarization).
2\fear of appreciation" given their concerns about loss of competitiveness (Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger, 2007).
Thus, exchange rate monitoring under IT poses some challenges for EMEs that di®er
from those in advanced economies. This might justify their more active useof exchange
rate policies|particularly in those countries where the exchange rate has previously
played a key role as a nominal anchor|despite heoretical reservations. Consequently, in
practice, EMEs with IT generally have less °exible exchange rate arrangements, intervene
more frequently in foreign exchange markets than their advanced economy counterparts
and respond more forcefully to real exchange rate movements (see Aizenmann et al., 2008,
and Chang, 2008).4
This adaptive way of implementing IT, referred to as \°exible IT", has generated an
intense debate about its validity and viability in EMEs, compared with \strict or pure
IT", where the exchange rate does not appear in the reaction function of central banks.5
That is, implicitly there is a policy dilemma between strictly ful¯lling the theoretical
requirements of IT or applying a \°exible IT", in the sense of using forex interventions
to smoothen the exchange rate movements.
To this respect, there are di®erent views in the literature. On the one hand, some
authors like Bernanke et al. (1999) hold that attending to IT and reacting to the ex-
change rate are mutually exclusive, as forex interventions could confuse the public about
the priorities of the central bank, which distorts expectations. On the other hand, less
strict authors argue that central banks might well interfere with the exchange rate volatil-
ity. For instance, according to Cordero (2009), forex interventions are fully justi¯ed, in
so far as EMEs need to maintain stable and competitive real exchange rates. In fact,
following Taylor (2000), some authors include the exchange rate in the policy reaction
function, arguing that it helps to mitigate the impact of shocks by dampening exchange
4In contrast to EMEs, the most common reason to perform FX interventions in IT advanced economies
is to correct an exchange rate misalignment (Stone et al., 2009). In EMEs, there are other reasons to
intervene, apart from moderating exchange rate volatility (for instance, to in°uence on the exchange rate
or to accumulate reserves).
5The term \°exible", as de¯ned in Svensson (2010), refers to IT central banks that look not only for
price stability but also for other variables, such as output gap or exchange rate.
3rate volatility (Kirnasova et al., 2006; Cavoli, 2008).
Other papers reach halfway conclusions about the role of exchange rates in IT regimes
from a more theoretical point of view. For instance, Stone et al. (2009) show that it
depends on the structure of the economy, the nature of the shocks, and the way in which
the exchange rate enters the policy rule. Along the same line, Parrado (2004) ¯nds that
the adoption of °exible or managed exchange rates in a small open economy under IT
depends on the nature and the sources of the shocks to the economy. Thus, the social loss
is much larger under \°exible IT" than under \strict IT" for real and external shocks,
while for nominal shocks the opposite holds. On the contrary, Yilmazkuday (2007), using
a calibrated model for Turkey, ¯nds that the welfare loss function is minimized under
\°exible IT" for all the types of shocks. Finally, Roger et al. (2009) use a DSGE model to
show that ¯nancially vulnerable EMEs are especially likely to bene¯t from some exchange
rate smoothing given the perverse impact of exchange rate movements on activity.
In line with this debate, the main objective of our paper is to analyze empirically the
relationship between IT, forex interventions and exchange rate volatility. That is, we try
to determine whether there is any di®erence in terms of exchange rate volatility between
the use of forex interventions in IT and non-IT countries. In other words, we want to
analyze whether the \fear of °oating" and \fear of appreciating" behavior of some central
banks could justify halfway policies between ¯xed and fully °oating, such as the \°exible
IT", which in practice is the most frequent way of EMEs to implement IT.
Our study of the link between these three variables is based on a panel data model
for 37 IT and non-IT EMEs from the ¯rst quarter of 1995 to the ¯rst quarter of 2010.
Note that we cover the last ¯nancial crisis, whose e®ects on the relationship between IT
adoption, forex interventions and exchange rate volatilities have not yet been analyzed
in detail.6 This crisis constitutes a natural experiment to test these links in turbulent
periods (Habermeier et al. 2009), as the relatively more important role of the exchange
rate policy in EMEs with IT than in developed countries became clear.7 Thus, once we
analyze the panel for the whole sample period, we also replicate our analysis for the time
6Among the few exceptions, see de Carvalho (2010).
7The tensions following the onset of the crisis were heightened by in°ation pressures (nearly all EMEs
with IT overshot their targets in 2008), much exchange rate volatility, and ¯nancial stress.
4previous to the onset of the ¯nancial crisis and the subsequent sub-sample. We date the
beginning of the crisis at 2008:Q3.
We conclude that, although IT leads to higher exchange rate volatility than alterna-
tive regimes, the forex interventions of some IT countries, mainly in Latin America, have
been more e®ective in reducing exchange rate volatility than those performed in non-IT
countries, especially after the onset of the crisis. Thus, our results support the implemen-
tation of \°exible IT" by policymakers, as forex interventions under IT seem to be even
more e®ective than those of non-IT countries in mitigating the exchange rate volatility.
This outcome represents an additional argument in favor of IT, which has demonstrated
to be sustainable during the crisis.8
The paper is organized as follows. After the introduction, Section 2 brie°y discusses
the literature and Section 3 describes the data set, including the three main variables
of the analysis: exchange rate volatility, forex interventions and a dummy variable that
captures the fact of having an IT. Then, Section 4 presents the methodology that will be
used to analyze the panel data set. In Section 5, we report the main empirical ¯ndings.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Overview of the empirical literature
Previous empirical contributions on the analysis of exchange rate volatility, IT adoption
and forex interventions were largely based on case studies of speci¯c countries. For
instance, Doma» c and Mendoza (2004) analyze this link for two IT countries, Mexico and
Turkey, and conclude that negative forex interventions (foreign exchange sales) reduced
the exchange rate volatility, whereas Guimar~ aes and Karacadag (2004) ¯nd that these
interventions had a limited e®ect on volatility.9 For Brazil, Minella et al. (2003) highlight
the importance of transparency of interventions to avoid a credibility deterioration of
monetary policy as a result of misunderstandings about the policy objective. Ger· sl and
Holub (2006) and Kamil (2008) analyze the role of forex interventions in two other IT
8In fact, no EME suspended IT after the ¯nancial crisis and only two countries adjusted their range.
9These two papers consider asymmetric e®ects, that is, a di®erent e®ects of positive or negative
interventions on exchange rate volatility.
5countries, the Czech Republic and Colombia, respectively, and conclude that occasional
interventions may be useful to stabilize the currency, although they are less e®ective when
there is an inconsistency between monetary and exchange rate policy goals.
There are some empirical papers for a wide sample of EMEs that separately analyze
two of our three main variables, exchange rate volatility and IT, or the former and forex
interventions. On the one hand, the literature on the e®ect of IT on exchange rate
volatility is not conclusive. Edwards (2007) studies whether exchange rate volatility is
di®erent in IT and non-IT countries and concludes that the volatility increases with IT,
as a result of the °exible exchange rate regimes; but after controlling for this variable the
link disappears. De Gregorio et al. (2005) ¯nd similar evidence for Chile. By contrast,
Rose (2007) studies a panel dataset and ¯nds that, as a result of IT credibility gains,
IT delivers the best outcomes in terms of lower exchange rate volatility, higher output
growth and lower in°ation than alternative regimes.
On the other hand, the empirical literature on the link between forex interventions and
exchange rate volatility, without considering the monetary regime, is not quite developed
either. Most of these contributions ¯t GARCH models for speci¯c countries (Dom¶ ³nguez,
1998, and Edison et al., 2006 analyze developed countries). Finally, IMF (2007) analyzes
¯ve Asian managed-°oating countries from 2000 to 2007 and ¯nds limited evidence for
interventions dampening exchange rate volatility.
Our paper contributes to the previous literature in at least three directions. First, we
analyze empirically the e®ect of forex interventions on the exchange rate volatility of IT
and non-IT EMEs. To our knowledge, this is the ¯rst empirical application that combines
the three variables for a panel of EMEs and does not rely on case studies of individual
countries. Second, in our setting, interventions can be asymmetric, in the sense of allowing
di®erent impacts for positive and negative interventions (foreign exchange purchases or
sales), which is also novel for a panel data framework. Finally, we also analyze the period
of the recent global crisis, which has not yet been much studied in this setting.
63 Data and explanatory variables
We perform a panel data analysis to test the implications in terms of exchange rate
volatility of forex interventions in IT countries. Our sample consists of 37 countries: we
compare the group of 18 EMEs that have already adopted IT (IMF, 2005, and Little
and Romano, 2009) and a control group of 19 non-targeting countries; see Appendix A
for the complete country list. In the control group we explicitly exclude countries with
a ¯xed exchange rate with the dollar or any other hard currency (like the euro) in the
whole sample period, as their exchange rate volatility is zero.10 We also exclude fully
dollarized countries, as they relinquish any possibility of having an autonomous exchange
rate policy.11 Finally, for the sake of comparability of both groups and following Lin
and Ye (2009), our control group includes non-targeting EMEs that have a real GDP per
capita and population at least as large as that of the poorest and smallest IT country,
which guarantees their economic relevance. With this selection criteria our control group
represents all emerging regions and covers a broad range of exchange rate regimes.
The sample runs from 1995:Q1 to 2010:Q1. The choice of initial period rested on
avoiding the potential problems of extreme movements in the exchange rates of many
EMEs until the mid-nineties, especially in Latin America, in the context of hyperin°a-
tion. We have also excluded some countries, such as Serbia, due to problems of data
availability at the beginning of the sample period. Where possible, we have obtained
missing observations at the beginning or end of the sample period from national sources,
so that our panel is well balanced.
To measure the exchange rate volatility, ¾ERt, we calculate the quarterly standard
deviation of daily returns. The percent return of the nominal exchange rate against the
dollar for a country i is expressed as,
rt = 100 £ (¢logEt) (1)
where, 8t = 1;:::;T, Et is the bilateral nominal exchange rate at t and ¢ is the di®erence
10There are some relevant currencies, like the Chinese yuan, that are in our control group although
China had a currency peg during most of the sample period. However, given its economic relevance and
that as its currency peg does not cover the whole sample period, we include China in our sample.
11We fololw Carranza et al. (2009) in identi¯ng fully dollarized and ¯xed exchange rate countries.
7operator (a positive rt represents a depreciation of the local currency against the dollar).12
In the paper we use the nominal bilateral exchange rate against the dollar because it
has advantages in terms of data availability and is a rather intuitive choice,being the
currency in which most EMEs borrow (Carranza et al., 2009).13 Note that this proxy is
not necessarily the best volatility approximation.14 Finally, our measure is less smooth
than that proposed in Rose (2007), who uses the standard deviation over a four year
window of monthly data.
Regarding IT, we build a binary dummy variable for each EME, ITt, that equals one
after formal IT adoption and zero otherwise (see Rose, 2007). To disentangle the formal
IT adoption date, we follow IMF (2005) and Little and Romano (2009), see Table 1.
Note that, given that dating IT adoption is not straightforward, we consider that of the
formal or explicit IT adoption for all countries, which may di®er from the date of the IT
announcement, when the IT could be combined with alternative objectives such as the
exchange rate or a money aggregate.
We approximate forex interventions with ¢RES, where RES is the ratio of foreign
exchange reserves to GDP.15 This variable approximates the pace of reserve accumulation
or losses as well as forex interventions of a country (a positive value indicates a net
purchase of foreign currency). However, one weakness of ¢RES as a proxy for forex
interventions is that we cannot distinguish whether the reserve variation is associated
with a real intervention in the foreign exchange markets or due to other reasons.16
In our analysis we are also interested in possible asymmetric e®ects of forex interven-
12Following Harvey et al. (1994), we subtract the mean of ¢log Et to guarantee zero mean returns.
13Nominal e®ective exchange rates are available by JP Morgan only for a small number of EMEs,
whereas IFS data, available at a monthly frequency, and used by Edwards (2007) and Rose (2007), also
su®er from this limitation.
14For instance, the volatility of a ¯xed exchange rate is zero, but if the exchange rate collapses as a
result of persistent misalignments its volatility jumps.
15To measure RES we tried to minimize the distortional e®ects of local currency depreciation on
nominal GDP denominated in dollars. We have also tried to clean out the e®ect of IMF disbursements and
repayments on RES. Nevertheless, this process is not straightforward, so that we have only considered
the two biggest repayments of our sample (Brazil (2005:Q4) and Argentina (2006:Q1)).
16One option that is beyond the scope of this paper would be to estimate an unobservable threshold
to disentangle those reserve variations that are truly linked to interventions (Kim and Sheen, 2002).
8tions. That is, we want to know if there is a di®erent e®ect on exchange rate volatility
in the case of an accumulation versus a loss of reserves (positive or negative forex inter-
ventions). For this type of analysis we use, for all countries and periods, the interaction
of ¢RESit with a dummy variable, Dit, that equals 1 if the stock of reserves to GDP
decreases and zero otherwise. That is, 8i = 1;:::;N, and 8t = 1;:::;T,
Dt = 1; if ¢RESt < 0
Dt = 0; otherwise.
(2)
Table 2 reports some summary statistics for IT and non-IT countries on ¾ER, RES,
forex interventions as proxied by ¢RES, and negative interventions, D £ ¢RES. We
analyze the full sample and the period before and after the crisis. Regarding ¾ER, the
mean volatility is higher in IT countries, especially in after the crisis, whereas non-IT
countries exhibit a higher coe±cient of variation than IT countries, which means that
the volatility jumps in these economies are greater. With respect to the stock of reserves,
the mean RES in the pre-crisis period is similar in both types of countries, but after the
crisis it is 0.29 in non-IT countries and 0.19 in IT countries. That is, once the more severe
phase of the crisis was over, the non-IT countries accumulated large reserves, whereas
in IT countries this mean is fairly stable. Regarding ¢RES, it is surprising that, on
average, IT and not-IT countries implement a similar volume of forex interventions in the
full sample, despite the requirements of a \strict IT". However, contrary to IT countries,
in the post-crisis period non-IT countries had on average negative forex interventions.
These statistics on ¢RESt mask negative interventions, as de¯ned by D £ ¢RES. In
the post-crisis period IT countries did sell foreign reserves, violating the principles of
\strict IT".
Finally, for the robustness of our results, we also use ¯ve control variables (see Ap-
pendix B for more details). Speci¯cally, we employ (1) the degree of trade openness, as
greater openness increases the reaction to real exchange rate shocks (Cavoli, 2008); (2)
current account (as percentage of GDP); (3) the natural logarithm of population, (4) the
real GDP per capita and (5) one ¯nancial variable that approximates global risk aversion,
proxied by the implied volatility of the S&P index (VIX).17 Table 3 shows the pairwise
17In previous versions we considered other control variables, which we have omitted due to their lack
9correlations of the ¯ve control variables and the main variables of our analysis.
4 Empirical model and econometric issues
4.1 The model
We ¯t nine panel data models, denoted as M1 to M9, which are based on di®erent
combinations of IT, RES, ¢RES and D. The estimation procedure is based on pooled
OLS with time dummies. We ¯t the models for the full sample, and for two sub-samples:
from 1995:Q1 to 2008:Q2, to characterize the period previous to the turmoil, and from
2008:Q3 to 2010:Q1, to analyze the impact of the recent ¯nancial crisis. Models M1 to
M3 are built from the expression
¾ERit = ¯0 + ¯1¾ERit¡1 + ¯2ITit + ¯3RESit + ¯4RESit £ ITit +
X
j
±jXjit + "it; (3)
where, 8i = 1;:::;N, and 8t = 1;:::;T, the exchange rate volatility, ¾ERit, is a function
of ¾ERit¡1to capture volatility persistence, ITit, RESit, the interaction between the two
and the set of ¯ve controls, Xit.
In models M4 and M5, we increase the number of drivers in (3) with Dit£RESit and
ITit £ Dit £ RESit, which will provide information about possible di®erent impacts of
reserve variations on exchange rate volatility, given an accumulation of reserves, where
Dit = 0, or a loss, where Dit = 1.
Finally, in models from M6 to M9 we include ¢RESit, which approximates the pace
of reserve accumulation or losses of country i. In particular, M6 follows the expression
¾ERit = ¯0 + ¯1¾ERit¡1 + ¯2ITit + ¯3¢RESit +
X
j
±jXjit + "it; (4)
whereas in models M7 to M9 we extend (4) by regressing the interaction of ¢RESit
with ITit and/or Dit. For the sake of clarity we omit RESit in speci¯cations M6 to
M9. The combination of these variables leads us to analyze whether in IT countries
of signi¯cance or multicolinearity problems. This is the case of the exchange rate regime as classi¯ed by
Ilzetzki et al. (2008), given its severe multicollinearity problems with IT and the volatility of commodities
prices (as measured by the CRB index).
10the e®ect of forex interventions on exchange rate volatility is di®erent to that in non-IT
countries. Moreover, we can also study whether this e®ect is asymmetric, that is, whether
the volatility e®ects of the purchases and sales of reserves on are di®erent and to check
whether there has been punishment for these interventions under an IT regime in the
form of higher exchange rate volatility than in non-IT countries.
Finally, we estimate the panel model using a six-quarter rolling window.18 This allows
us to analyze the evolution of total e®ects of positive and negative interventions on IT
and non-IT countries over the sample period. These time-varying coe±cients indicate,
for instance, whether these links changed during the last crisis.
4.2 Statistical inference
As mentioned, we distinguish between (i) countries with IT or not; and, (ii) countries
that have lost or accumulated reserves (D=1 or D=0, respectively). Their combination
lead to four possible total e®ects of forex interventions on ¾ER, so that we can use their
coe±cients for the purpose of statistical inference. We calculate these four possible total
e®ects from the sum of the relevant coe±cients. Namely, (1) the estimate for ¢RES
indicates the impact of positive forex interventions by a non-IT country, whereas (2) the
coe±cient of ¢RES + (D £ ¢RES) indicates that of negative interventions in non-IT
countries; (3) ¢RES + (IT £ ¢RES) denotes the e®ect of positive interventions in IT
countries, and, ¯nally (4) ¢RES +(IT £ ¢RES)+(D £ ¢RES)+ (IT £ D £ ¢RES)
stands for the impact of negative interventions in IT countries.
Statistical inference is useful to analyze more formally the signi¯cance of the e®ects
of interventions on the exchange rate volatility depending on IT adoption or on the
intervention sign. To this end we propose two Wald-type tests. First, we analyze whether
the impact of negative interventions in IT countries is di®erent than that of non-IT
countries. To con¯rm this hypothesis, we test the null,
H0 : ¯IT£¢RES + ¯IT£D£¢RES = 0; (5)
where ¯j denotes the coe±cient of the explanatory variable j. If interventions performed
18The length of the rolling window has been chosen to coincide with the post-crisis sample size.
11by IT counties have a di®erent e®ect on ¾ER, the null in (5) will be rejected. Second,
we study whether the e®ect of interventions in IT countries is signi¯catively asymmetric,
that is, whether negative interventions have a di®erent e®ect on ¾ER than do positive
interventions, by testing the null hypothesis,
H0 : ¯D£¢RES + ¯IT£D£¢RES = 0 (6)
If interventions are asymmetric, this null will be rejected. In Section 5 we interpret some
of these statistics.
4.3 Econometric issues
As mentioned, our estimation procedure is based on pooled OLS with time dummies. Our
estimation approach entails several problems. First, we cannot use country ¯xed e®ect
dummies, as IT is time-invariant in certain subperiods, so that country ¯xed e®ects would
translate to the intercept. However, the set of control variables allows us to control for
the unobserved heterogeneity across countries.
Another di±culty in the analysis is the potential for endogeneity biases due reverse
causality and omitted variables. Although the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) is well-known for tackling endogeneity issues in a
dynamic panel data framework, we cannot use this procedure, as GMM is only consistent
in short panels (N >> T), which is not the case here (T = 61 and N = 37).
As regards reverse causality, this could be a concern in analyzing the links between
our three main variables. For instance, with respect to the relationship between exchange
rate volatility and forex interventions, one can regards forex interventions as helpful in
managing market uncertainty or argue that the forex interventions simply coincide with
periods of greater uncertainty, which then gives cause for intervention. To further analyze
this relation, we also performed several Hausman-Wu tests (Hausman, 1983; Wu, 1973).
According to these tests, we can consider ¢RES as exogenous to ¾ER in t, as all tests
failed to reject the null of exogeneity (these tests are available upon request), so that
¢RES would be independent of the errors in the models.19
19As an additional robustness test of our pooled OLS estimates, we also tried to address the possible
12On the other hand, the causality relation between exchange rate volatility and IT
adoption seems clearer. Edwards (2007) and Rose (2007) study the e®ect on exchange
rate volatility of following an IT. However, Gon» calves and Carvalho (2008) analyze the
opposite causality relation and show that the volatility of the real exchange rate (as a
proxy of adverse shocks) is not statistically signi¯cant for explaining the probability of
IT adoption. Regarding possible omitted variable bias, the set of control variables helps
to identify them.
5 Empirical results
5.1 The role of IT adoption and RES
Table 4 reports the estimates for models M1 to M9 for the whole sample period (upper
panel), as well as for the pre-crisis and post-crisis period (central panel and lower panel,
respectively).
Is IT associated with higher exchange rate volatility? As a ¯rst result, IT seems to
be related to higher ¾ER, given the positive and signi¯cant coe±cients of IT in Table
4. This link is robust across speci¯cations and it is even stronger and more signi¯cant
after the crisis, when this relation was exacerbated (as also reported in Table 2). This
result is in line with De Gregorio et al. (2005) or Edwards (2007), and contrary to
Rose (2007), who concludes that IT does not come at the cost of higher exchange rate
volatility. This positive association could be largely explained by the own exchange rate
regime. However, we explicitly exclude this control variable in the model, as it is highly
correlated with IT, which leads to serious multicollinearity problems.20
reverse causality biases via instrumental variables (IV) approach, using lagged forex interventions as
instruments. We chose these lagged variables as instruments of ¢RES because they can be regarded
as exogenous to the exchange rate volatility and are correlated with ¢RES. However, the correlation
between ¢RESt and ¢RESt¡1 is relatively low. Also note that in the main results of the IV estimates
the e®ect of ¾ERt¡1 and IT dominate, and prevent identi¯cation of the e®ects of interventions.
20To prove this a priori assumption, we added, as a control variable, the exchange rate regime as
measured by the monthly coarse classi¯cation of Ilzetzki et al. (2008). This index labels countries from
1 to 6 in increasing order according to their degree of exchange rate °exibility. As expected, this control
13As shown in Table 4 there is a negative link between RES and ¾ER for the whole
sample, and the coe±cients (around -0.4) are quite robust across speci¯cations. A possible
interpretation is that larger stocks of reserves coincide with more stable exchange rates.
The negative relation is even higher for IT countries, as shown by the estimates of IT £
RES for M3 to M5. This might be a consequence of the higher °exibility of their
exchange rates, which exacerbates the favorable e®ect of reserve accumulation on ¾ER.
This negative association cannot be identi¯ed after the crisis in non-IT countries, as
the estimates for IT countries|usually higher than in non-IT countries|dominate the
relation between RES and ¾ER.
5.2 The e®ect of forex interventions on the volatility
As mentioned, we also distinguish periods of currency appreciation pressures (when the
central bank buys reserves) from those of depreciationpressures (when the central bank
sells reserves); with D as de¯ned in (2). As shown by the estimates of IT £ RES £ D
in M4 and M5 in Table 4, the negative link between RES and ¾ER seems to be di®erent
under appreciation or depreciation pressures for the whole sample and for the pre-crisis
period in IT countries. That is, under depreciation pressures, the IT countries with larger
bu®ers of foreign reserves have less exchange rate volatility.
For models M6 to M9 in Table 4, the results that directly involve ¢RESare displayed.
The analysis of the impact of forex interventions on exchange rate volatility is particularly
relevant. As already stated, EMEs commonly intervene very frequently, even under IT, to
stabilize the exchange rate. We have three main results. First, forex interventions seem to
reduce the exchange rate volatility only in IT countries, whereas, surprisingly, in non-IT
countries interventions are not signi¯cant. This result is robust across subsamples. In
fact, the null hypothesis is clearly rejected in (5), so that negative interventions in IT
and non-IT countries have di®erent e®ects on volatility.21
Second, regarding the signs of interventions, the sales of reserves tend to be signi¯cant
in IT countries in both subsamples (the estimates of IT £ D £ ¢RES are negative
leads to non-signi¯cant IT coe±cients and multicollinearity.
21The p-value associated with the joint Wald-type test for M9 is 0.008.
14and signi¯cant).22 After the crisis positive interventions are also signi¯cant. However,
both e®ects are asymmetric in the sense that the impact of negative interventions is
signi¯catively di®erent than that of positive interventions, as con¯rmed by the test of the
null in (6).23
Finally, in IT countries, the total e®ect of smaller reserves on exchange rate volatility
increases after the crisis, as shown by the sum of coe±cients, ¢RES + (IT £ ¢RES) +
(D £ ¢RES) + (IT £ D £ ¢RES).
We complete this analysis with a study of the time-varying e®ect of negative and pos-
itive forex interventions on exchange rate volatility in IT and non-IT countries. Figures 1
and 2 represent the coe±cients of the total e®ects of negative and positive interventions,
respectively, obtained after ¯tting again the panel using a six-quarter rolling window.
According to Figure 1, in non-IT countries the e®ect of negative interventions is negative
(that is, sales of foreign reserves are associated with even greater exchange rate volatility)
or close to zero at the end of the sample, although this e®ect is not signi¯cant.24 Mean-
while, since 2005 in IT countries, this link is increasingly positive and signi¯cant. Thus,
Figure 1 con¯rms previous results in the sense that negative interventions seem to be
useful for reducing the exchange rate volatility, especially in the last part of the sample,
whereas in non-IT countries these interventions have a limited impact on volatility.
On the other hand, Figure 2, which represents the coe±cients of the rolling window
estimates for IT and non-IT countries under positive interventions, illustrates that in
non-IT countries this e®ect is around zero over the sample. Nevertheless, in IT countries
the total coe±cient becomes negative, especially since 2008.25 Again, these conclusions
con¯rm our previous results.
All in all, our results support the role of forex interventions in IT countries, especially
22For a negative intervention, IT £ D £ ¢RES is negative, so that a positive coe±cient implies a
negative e®ect on ¾ER.
23We reject the null hypothesis of symmetric e®ects on the exchange rate volatility of positive and
negative interventions at 10%, and the p-value of the test for M9 is 0.081.
24We also calculated the t-values of the sum of coe±cients with the delta method. These results are
available upon request.
25The total e®ect of positive forex interventions is non signi¯cant for non-IT countries, whereas in IT
countries they are signi¯cant since 2008.
15during crisis periods. Our outcomes also raise doubts about the e®ectiveness of forex
interventions in non-IT countries for reducing the exchange rate volatility. Nor do we
not identify any signi¯cant e®ect of interventions of IT countries in tranquil periods with
appreciation pressures.
5.3 Analysis by region
Finally, we perform the same analysis by region, namely for Latin America, Emerging
Asia and Eastern Europe. Tables 5 to 7 report these estimates, respectively.
Regarding Latin America, the main result in Table 5 is that IT£ ¢RES and IT £
D £ ¢RES are signi¯cant in the post-crisis period. That is, forex interventions carried
out by IT countries during the crisis were associated with lower ¾ER, which is again a
result favorable to forex interventions during crisis times in IT countries. On the other
hand, the positive link between IT and ¾ER is identi¯ed only in the post-crisis period.
One possible interpretation might be that before the crisis ¾ER had extreme values in
some non-IT and IT countries|before IT adoption|corresponding to di®erent domestic
crisis episodes (for instance, Argentine, Mexico or Brazil). Finally, in Latin America
the negative relation between RES and ¾ER is stronger in IT countries, but only in the
pre-crisis period, when a considerable amount of reserves had accumulated.
According to the estimates for Emerging Asia in Table 6, IT loses its signi¯cance in
the post-crisis period. Moreover, RES is only signi¯cant in the post-crisis period and its
coe±cient is higher than for the whole country sample and ¢RES plays no role for either
IT or non-IT countries. Finally, regarding Eastern Europe, the positive link between IT
and ¾ER is only identi¯ed in the pre-crisis period, as reported in Table 7. However, we
do not ¯nd any signi¯cant relation between RES and exchange rate volatility and, as in
Emerging Asia, ¢RES is not signi¯cant in any speci¯cation, as far as these estimates
seem to be dominated by the dynamics of ¾ERt¡1. All in all, the full sample results for
the post-crisis period regarding ¢RES, reported in Table 4, seem to be dominated by
certain counties in our Latin American sample.
166 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed empirically the link between exchange rate volatility and
IT and forex interventions. In practice most central banks with IT have tried to conduct
monetary policy with some form of price stabilization objective and to manage move-
ments in its currency (\°exible IT"), these forex interventions might have implications
for monetary policy and the use of policy rules. In this sense, \°exible IT" implies a
departure from the corner solutions of the \impossibility Holy Trinity" of ¯xed exchange
rates, independent monetary policy and perfect capital mobility, and have several broad
implications for the role of the exchange rate in IT countries.
To analyze this question we estimate a panel data model for 37 IT and non-IT EMEs.
We study the impact of IT adoption and foreign reserve movements, which we roughly
interpret as forex interventions, on the exchange rate volatility. We also perform this
analysis for the period previous to the onset of the ¯nancial crisis and the subsequent
sub-sample. This exercise is useful for studying whether IT does make a di®erence in
terms of the impact of forex interventions on exchange rate volatility.
We con¯rm that exchange rates are more volatile under IT than under other regimes in
EMEs, which is at odds with the results in Rose (2007). However, we also show that forex
interventions in IT countries do play a useful role in containing exchange rate volatility,
especially of the negative kind (sales of foreign reserves). This outcome is particularly
signi¯cant after the onset of the recent ¯nancial crisis in Latin America. Surprisingly,
this role of negative forex interventions in the moderation of the exchange rate volatility
is not identi¯ed for non-IT countries.
All in all, we support the view that there is some scope for EMEs that have adopted IT
to interpret the implementation of their IT mechanisms with a certain degree of °exibility.
Thus, \°exible IT" regimes are not only sustainable, but forex interventions performed
under this scheme are even more e®ective than those of non-IT countries in mitigating
extreme volatility. However, there is still room for future research to analyze whether
these episodes of heavy forex interventions have not undermined the credibility of these
central banks.
17Appendix A: Country list
In°ation targeters Non-in°ation targeters
Brazil Peru Albania Guatemala
Colombia Philippines Algeria India
Czech Republic Poland Argentina Jamaica
Chile Romania Cambodia Malaysia
Ghana Slovak Republic China Morocco
Hungary South Africa Costa Rica Russia
Indonesia South Korea Croatia Singapore
Israel Thailand Dominican Republic Ukraine
Mexico Turkey Egypt Uruguay
Vietnam
Appendix B: De¯nition of variables and data sources
² IT: Dummy variable that equals one if the country had a formal IT in that quarter.
Source: IMF (2005) and Little and Romano (2009).
² Reserves, RESit: Foreign exchange reserves to nominal GDP ratio in US dollars.
Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF).
² Openness: Exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. Source: International
Financial Statistics (IMF), Datastream and national sources.
² Current account: Current account as a percentage of GDP. Source: International
Financial Statistics (IMF), Datastream and national sources.
² Population: Logarithm of population (thousand persons). Source: World Economic
Outlook (IMF).
² GDP per capita: Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP)
per capita. Source: World Economic Outlook (IMF).
² VIX: Implicit volatility of the S&P 500 index. Source: Datastream.
18References
[1] Aizenman, J., Hutchison, M., Noy, I., 2008. In°ation targeting and real exchange
rates in emerging markets. NBER Working Paper No. 14561.
[2] Arellano, M., Bond, S.R., 1991. Some tests of speci¯cation for panel data: Monte
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic
Studies 58, 277{298.
[3] Ball, L., Sheridan, N., 2005. Does In°ation Targeting Matter?, in: Bernanke, B.,
Woodford, M. (Eds.), The In°ation Targeting Debate. The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, pp. 249-276.
[4] Bernanke, B., Laubach, T., Posen, A., Mishkin, F., 1999. In°ation targeting: Lessons
from the international experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
[5] Brito, R., Bystedt, B., 2010. In°ation targeting in emerging economies: panel evi-
dence. Journal of Development Economics 91, 198-210.
[6] Calvo, G., Reinhart, C., 2002. Fear of °oating. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117,
379-408.
[7] Carranza, L., Gald¶ on-S¶ anchez, J.E., Gomez-Biscarri, J., 2009. Exchange rate and
in°ation dynamics in dollarized economies. Journal of Development Economics 89,
98-108.
[8] de Carvalho, I., 2010. In°ation targeting and the crisis: An empirical assessment.
IMF Working Paper 10/45.
[9] Cavoli, T., 2008. The exchange rate and optimal monetary policy rules in open and
developing economies: some simple analytics. Economic Modelling 25, 1011-1021.
[10] Cavoli, T., 2009. Is fear of °oating justi¯ed? The East Asia experience. Journal of
Policy Modeling 31, 1-16.
19[11] Chang, R., 2008. In°ation targeting, reserves accumulation, and exchange rate man-
agement in Latin America. Banco de la Rep¶ ublica de Colombia, Borradores de
Econom¶ ³a 487.
[12] Cordero, J., 2009. In°ation targeting and the real exchange in a small economy:
A structuralist approach, in: G. Epstein, G., Yeldan, E. (Eds.), Beyond In°ation
Targeting, pp. 44-67.
[13] Doma» c, I., Mendoza, A., 2004. Is there room for foreign exchange interventions under
an in°ation targeting framework? Evidence from Mexico and Turkey. World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 3288.
[14] Dom¶ ³nguez, K. M., 1998. Central bank intervention and exchange rate volatility.
Journal of International Money and Finance 17, 161-190.
[15] Edison, H., Cashin, P., Liang, H., 2006. Foreign exchange intervention and the Aus-
tralian dollar: has it mattered? International Journal of Finance and Economics 11,
155-171.
[16] Edwards, S., 2007. The relationship between exchange rates and in°ation target-
ing revisited, in: Mishkin, F., Schmidt- Hebbel, K. (Eds.), Monetary Policy under
In°ation Targeting, Banco Central de Chile, Santiago, pp. 373-413.
[17] Ger· sl, A., Holub T., 2006. Foreign exchange interventions under in°ation targeting:
The Czech experience. Contemporary Economic Policy 24, 475-491.
[18] Guimar~ aes, R., Karacadag, C., 2004. The empirics of foreign exchange intervention
in emerging market countries: The cases of Mexico and Turkey. IMF Working Paper
04/123.
[19] Gon» calves, C.E., Carvalho, A., 2008. Who chooses to in°ation target? Economics
Letters 99, 410-413.
[20] Gon» calves, C.E, Salles, J., 2008. In°ation targeting in emerging economies: What
do the data say? Journal of Development Economics 85, 312-318.
20[21] De Gregorio, J., Tokman, A., Vald¶ es, R., 2005. Flexible exchange rate with in-
°ation targeting in Chile: Experience and issues. Inter-American Development
Bank,working paper #540.
[22] Habermeier, K., Ä Otker, I., J¶ acome, L., Giustiniani, A., Ishi, K., V¶ avra, D., Kisingay,
T., V¶ azquez, F., 2009. In°ation pressures and monetary policy options in emerging
and developing countries { A cross regional perspective. IMF Working Paper 06/278.
[23] Harvey, A., Ruiz, E., Shephard, N., 1994. Multivariate stochastic variance models.
The Review of Economic Studies 61, 247-264.
[24] Hausman, J., 1983. Speci¯cation and estimation of simultaneous equation models,
in: Griliches, Z., Intrillgator, M.D. (Eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. I. North-
Holland, Amsterdam.
[25] International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2005. Does in°ation targeting work in emerging
markets?, in: World Economic Outlook, September 2005, pp. 161-186.
[26] Internacional Monetary Fund (IMF), 2007. Regional Economic Outlook, Asia and
Paci¯c, October 2007.
[27] Ilzetzki, E., Reinhart, C., Rogo®, K., 2008. Exchange rate arrangements into the
21st Century: Will the anchor currency hold? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119,
1-48. (Updated database).
[28] Kamil, H., 2008. Is central bank intervention e®ective under in°ation targeting
regimes? The case of Colombia. IMF Working Paper 08/88.
[29] Kim, S., Sheen, J., 2002. The determinants of foreign exchange intervention by
central banks: evidence from Australia. Journal of International money and Finance
21, 619-649.
[30] Kirnasova, T., Leith, C., Wren-Lewis, S., 2006. Should central banks target consumer
prices or the exchange rate? The Economic Journal 116, 208-231.
[31] Levy-Yeyati, E., Sturzenegger, F., 2007. Fear of Appreciation. KSG Working Paper
07-047, Harvard University.
21[32] Lin, S., Ye, H., 2009. Does in°ation targeting make a di®erence in developing coun-
tries? Journal of Development Economics 89, 118-123.
[33] Little, J. S., Romano, T. F., 2009. In°ation targeting - Central bank practice over-
seas. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Public Policy Briefs #08-1.
[34] Mihov. I., Rose, A., 2008. Is old money better than new? Duration and monetary
regimes, Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 2, 2008-13.
[35] Minella, A., Springer de Freitas, P., Goldfajn, I., Muinhos, M.K., 2003. In°ation
targeting in Brazil: Constructing credibility under exchange rate volatility. Journal
of International Money and Finance 22, 1015-1040.
[36] Mishkin, F., Savastano, M., 2001. Monetary policy strategies for Latin America.
Journal of Development Economics 66, 415-444.
[37] Mishkin, F., Schmidt-Hebbel, K., 2007. Does in°ation targeting make a di®erence?,
in: Mishkin, F., Schmidt- Hebbel, K. (Eds.), Monetary Policy under In°ation Tar-
geting, Banco Central de Chile, Santiago, pp. 291-372.
[38] Obstfeld, M., Shambaugh, J. C., Taylor, A. M., 2005. The trilemma in history:
Tradeo®s among exchange rates, monetary policies, and capital mobility. The Review
of Economics and Statistics 87, 423-438.
[39] Parrado, E., 2004. In°ation targeting and exchange rules in an open economy. IMF
Working Paper 04/21.
[40] Roger, S., Restrepo, J., Garc¶ ³a, C., 2009. Hybrid in°ation targeting regimes. IMF
Working Paper 09/234.
[41] Rose, A., 2007. A stable international monetary system emerges: In°ation targeting
is Bretton Woods, reversed. Journal of International Money and Finance, 26, 663-
681.
[42] Stone, M., Roger, S., Shimizu, S., Nordstrom, A., Kisinbay, T., Restrepo, J., 2009.
The role of exchange rate in in°ation-targeting emerging economies. IMF Ocassional
Paper no. 267.
22[43] Svensson, L. 2010, In°ation targeting, NBER Working Paper 16654.
[44] Taylor, J. 2000. Low in°ation, pass-through and the pricing power of ¯rms. European
Economic Review 7, 1389-1408.
[45] Wu, D., 1973. Alternative tests of independence between stochastic regressors and
disturbances. Econometrica 41, 733-750.
[46] Yilmazkuday, H., 2007. In°ation targeting supported by managed exchange rate.
Applied Economics 39, 2011-2026.
23Figure 1: Six-quarter rolling window estimates. Total e®ect of negative forex interventions
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Figure 2: Six-quarter rolling window estimates. Total e®ect of positive forex interventions
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24Table 1: Date of adoption of formal IT in emerging markets and current target. Sources:
IMF (2005), Little and Romano (2009) and national sources.
IT adoption date Point target (%) Target range (%)
Israel Jun. 1997 None 1 ¡ 3
Czech Republic Jan. 1998 3:0 § 1:0
South Korea Apr. 1998 None 3:5 ¡ 4:0
Poland Jan. 1999 2:5 § 1:0
Brazil Jun. 1999 4:5 § 2:0
Chile Sep. 1999 3:0 § 1:0
Colombia Sep. 1999 None 2 ¡ 4
South Africa Feb. 2000 None 3 ¡ 6
Thailand May. 2000 None 0 ¡ 3:5
Mexico Jan. 2001 3:0 § 1:0
Hungary Jul. 2001 3:0 § 1:0
Peru Jan. 2002 2:0 § 1:0
Philippines Jan. 2002 None 4 ¡ 5
Slovak Republic Jan. 2005 None None
Indonesia Jul. 2005 5:0 § 1:0
Romania Aug. 2005 3:5 § 1:0
Turkey Jan. 2006 7:5 § 2:0
Ghana May. 2007 None 6 ¡ 8
Source: IMF(2005) and Little and Romano (2009); current IT point target and range target also obtained
from national sources. Slovak Republic became non-IT in January 2009 after Euro adoption.
25Table 2: Summary statistics for ¾ER, RES, ¢RES and D £ ¢RES for a sample of 37
countries (quarterly data, based on nominal exchange rates against the dollar). We use
2008:Q3 as the starting date of the crisis.
Mean CV Max Min
IT Non-IT IT Non-IT IT Non-IT IT Non-IT
¾ER Full sample 0:643 0:507 0:676 1:289 4:507 8:637 0:041 0:000
Pre crisis 0:565 0:501 0:561 1:331 2:818 8:637 0:041 0:000
After crisis 0:971 0:575 0:676 0:861 4:507 4:251 0:141 0:000
RES Full sample 0:167 0:186 0:444 0:984 0:505 1:026 0:036 0:006
Pre crisis 0:164 0:177 0:420 0:987 0:415 1:026 0:036 0:006
After crisis 0:187 0:285 0:502 0:830 0:505 1:018 0:082 0:041
¢RES Full sample 0:002 0:002 7:311 6:916 0:086 0:080 ¡0:043 ¡0:101
Pre crisis 0:001 0:003 11:521 5:312 0:086 0:080 ¡0:043 ¡0:085
After crisis 0:005 ¡0:003 3:550 ¡7:871 0:061 0:069 ¡0:028 ¡0:101
D £ ¢RES Full sample ¡0:003 ¡0:004 ¡1:833 ¡2:162 0:000 0:000 ¡0:043 ¡0:101
Pre crisis ¡0:003 ¡0:003 ¡1:848 ¡2:148 0:000 0:000 ¡0:043 ¡0:085
After crisis ¡0:004 ¡0:010 ¡1:743 ¡1:639 0:000 0:000 ¡0:028 ¡0:101
Summary statistics for exchange rate volatility based on nominal exchange rates against the dollar
(¾ER), the stock of foreign reserves (RES); forex interventions (¢RES) and negative forex interventions
(D£¢RES). CV: coe±cient of variation (standard deviation / mean); Max: Maximum; Min: Minimum.
Table 3: Correlation matrix
¾ER IT RES ¢RES D £ ¢RES Current account Openness Population GDP per capita VIX
¾ER 1
IT 0:10¤ 1
RES ¡0:14¤ ¡0:05¤ 1
¢RES 0:00 ¡0:01 0:12¤ 1
D £ ¢RES ¡0:05¤ 0:05¤ ¡0:18¤ 0:74¤ 1
Current account ¡0:06¤ ¡0:08¤ 0:65¤ 0:15¤ ¡0:05¤ 1
Openness 0:03 0:01 0:11¤ ¡0:04 ¡0:02 ¡0:10¤ 1
Population ¡0:07¤ 0:08¤ ¡0:14¤ 0:04 0:09¤ 0:12¤ ¡0:20¤ 1
GDP per capita 0:05¤ 0:36¤ 0:39¤ ¡0:01 ¡0:10¤ 0:24¤ 0:16¤ ¡0:38¤ 1
VIX 0:25¤ 0:05¤ 0:02 ¡0:03 ¡0:09¤ ¡0:02 ¡0:02 0:01 0:05¤ 1
¤ signi¯cant pairwise correlation at 5%.
26Table 4: OLS coe±cient estimates from regressions of exchange rate volatility on IT
dummy and foreign reserves.
Total sample
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
¾ER;t¡1 0:53¤¤¤ 0:52¤¤¤ 0:51¤¤¤ 0:51¤¤¤ 0:51¤¤¤ 0:53¤¤¤ 0:53¤¤¤ 0:53¤¤¤ 0:53¤¤¤
IT 0:07¤¤ 0:05 0:15¤¤ 0:15¤¤ 0:15¤¤ 0:07¤¤ 0:07¤¤ 0:07¤¤ 0:10¤¤¤
RES ¡0:45¤¤¤ ¡0:40¤¤¤ ¡0:39¤¤ ¡0:39¤¤
IT £ RES ¡0:56¤¤ ¡0:56¤¤ ¡0:54¤¤
D £ RES ¡0:01 0:01
IT £ D £ RES ¡0:31¤
¢RES ¡0:57 ¡0:45 0:70 1:70
IT £ ¢RES ¡0:58 ¡3:32
D £ ¢RES ¡3:03 ¡4:85
IT £ D £ ¢RES 9:30¤¤
N 2048 2039 2039 2039 2039 2036 2036 2036 2036
R2 0:39 0:40 0:40 0:40 0:40 0:39 0:39 0:39 0:39
Pre-crisis
¾ER;t¡1 0:52¤¤¤ 0:51¤¤¤ 0:51¤¤¤ 0:51¤¤¤ 0:51¤¤¤ 0:53¤¤¤ 0:53¤¤¤ 0:53¤¤¤ 0:52¤¤¤
IT 0:06¤ 0:04 0:12¤ 0:12¤ 0:13¤ 0:06¤ 0:06¤ 0:07¤ 0:09¤¤
RES ¡0:48¤¤¤ ¡0:44¤¤ ¡0:44¤¤ ¡0:44¤¤
IT £ RES ¡0:48¤ ¡0:49¤ ¡0:46¤
D £ RES 0:01 0:02
IT £ D £ RES ¡0:35¤¤
¢RES ¡0:68 ¡0:82 1:11 1:61
IT £ ¢RES 0:80 ¡1:96
D £ ¢RES ¡4:49 ¡6:05
IT £ D £ ¢RES 8:99¤¤
N 1819 1810 1810 1810 1810 1807 1807 1807 1807
R2 0:35 0:36 0:36 0:36 0:36 0:35 0:35 0:36 0:36
Post-crisis
¾ER;t¡1 0:51¤¤¤ 0:51¤¤¤ 0:48¤¤¤ 0:48¤¤¤ 0:48¤¤¤ 0:51¤¤¤ 0:52¤¤¤ 0:52¤¤¤ 0:50¤¤¤
IT 0:11 0:10 0:31¤¤ 0:32¤¤ 0:32¤¤ 0:13¤ 0:14¤ 0:12¤ 0:20¤¤
RES ¡0:15 ¡0:02 ¡0:05 ¡0:04
IT £ RES ¡0:98¤¤ ¡0:97¤¤ ¡0:95¤
D £ RES 0:08 0:10
IT £ D £ RES ¡0:28
¢RES ¡1:53 ¡0:38 ¡2:50 2:19
IT £ ¢RES ¡3:49 ¡7:41¤
D £ ¢RES 1:95 ¡4:05
IT £ D £ ¢RES 15:82¤
N 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229
R2 0:57 0:57 0:58 0:58 0:58 0:57 0:57 0:57 0:58
¤ p < 0:05; ¤¤ p < 0:01; ¤¤¤ p < 0:001; Pooled OLS estimations. Dependent variable: Exchange rate
volatility (proxied by quarterly standard deviation of daily rt|log di®erence of bilateral exchange rate
against the dollar|; IT : binary dummy, IT=1 if countries have adopted IT; RES: Foreign reserves
over GDP; D: binary dummy, D = 1 if ¢RES < 0 ; Controls not reported but included: (1) Current
account as percentage of GDP; (2) Trade openness; (3) Log of population; (4) GDP per capita; (5) VIX
index; Intercept and time controls included but not reported; We consider 2008:Q3 as the start of the
¯nancial crisis.
27Table 5: OLS coe±cient estimates from regressions of exchange rate volatility on IT
dummy and foreign reserves. Latin America.
Latin America: Total sample
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
¾ER;t¡1 0:50¤¤¤ 0:42¤¤¤ 0:42¤¤¤ 0:42¤¤¤ 0:42¤¤¤ 0:50¤¤¤ 0:50¤¤¤ 0:50¤¤¤ 0:49¤¤¤
IT 0:03 0:11 0:04 0:04 0:04 0:02 0:02 0:03 0:08
RES ¡2:40¤¤¤ ¡2:60¤¤¤ ¡2:59¤¤¤ ¡2:63¤¤¤
IT £ RES 0:56 0:57 0:69
D £ RES ¡0:05 0:10
IT £ D £ RES ¡0:88
¢RES ¡3:86 ¡4:94¤ ¡1:64 ¡0:11
IT £ ¢RES 4:45 ¡4:38
D £ ¢RES ¡4:97 ¡10:78
IT £ D £ ¢RES 22:96¤
N 591 591 591 591 591 59 591 591 591
R2 0:40 0:43 0:43 0:43 0:43 0:40 0:40 0:40 0:41
Latin America: Pre-crisis
¾ER;t¡1 0:48¤¤¤ 0:41¤¤¤ 0:41¤¤¤ 0:41¤¤¤ 0:41¤¤¤ 0:48¤¤¤ 0:48¤¤¤ 0:48¤¤¤ 0:48¤¤¤
IT ¡0:01 0:07 ¡0:02 ¡0:02 ¡0:01 ¡0:01 ¡0:02 ¡0:01 0:02
RES ¡2:42¤¤¤ ¡2:66¤¤¤ ¡2:66¤¤¤ ¡2:69¤¤¤
IT £ RES 0:71 0:72 0:75
D £ RES ¡0:02 0:08
IT £ D £ RES ¡0:60
¢RES ¡4:82¤ ¡5:60¤ ¡1:71 ¡1:07
IT £ ¢RES 3:52 ¡1:99
D £ ¢RES ¡7:20 ¡10:32
IT £ D £ ¢RES 15:00
N 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524
R2 0:37 0:41 0:41 0:41 0:41 0:38 0:38 0:38 0:38
Latin America: Post-crisis
¾ER;t¡1 0:44¤¤ 0:31¤ 0:24 0:20 0:21 0:43¤¤ 0:42¤¤ 0:43¤¤ 0:42¤¤
IT 0:19 0:37¤¤ 0:91¤¤¤ 1:02¤¤¤ 0:95¤¤¤ 0:19 0:20 0:21 0:34¤
RES ¡2:64¤¤ ¡0:46 ¡0:70 ¡0:83
IT £ RES ¡3:60¤¤ ¡4:04¤¤ ¡3:28¤
D £ RES 0:82 1:16
IT £ D £ RES ¡1:44
¢RES 3:21 1:34 ¡2:82 7:92
IT £ ¢RES 4:20 ¡18:72¤
D £ ¢RES 9:95 ¡12:66
IT £ D £ ¢RES 45:73¤
N 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
R2 0:61 0:66 0:68 0:69 0:70 0:61 0:62 0:62 0:67
¤ p < 0:05; ¤¤ p < 0:01; ¤¤¤ p < 0:001; Pooled OLS estimations. Dependent variable: Exchange rate
volatility (proxied by quarterly standard deviation of daily rt|log di®erence of bilateral exchange rate
against the dollar|; IT : binary dummy, IT=1 if countries have adopted IT; RES: Foreign reserves
over GDP; D: binary dummy, D = 1 if ¢RES < 0 ; Controls not reported but included: (1) Current
account as percentage of GDP; (2) Trade openness; (3) Log of population; (4) GDP per capita; (5) VIX
index; Intercept and time controls included but not reported; We consider 2008:Q3 as the start of the
¯nancial crisis.
28Table 6: OLS coe±cient estimates from regressions of exchange rate volatility on IT
dummy and foreign reserves. Emerging Asia.
Asia: Total sample
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
¾ER;t¡1 0:65¤¤¤ 0:62¤¤¤ 0:62¤¤¤ 0:62¤¤¤ 0:62¤¤¤ 0:66¤¤¤ 0:66¤¤¤ 0:66¤¤¤ 0:66¤¤¤
IT ¡0:17¤ ¡0:24¤ ¡0:36¤ ¡0:36¤ ¡0:36¤ ¡0:16¤ ¡0:14 ¡0:16¤ ¡0:14
RES ¡1:12¤ ¡1:18¤ ¡1:18¤ ¡1:18¤
IT £ RES 0:50 0:49 0:49
D £ RES ¡0:01 ¡0:01
IT £ D £ RES 0:21
¢RES ¡2:38 ¡1:66 ¡2:96 ¡1:64
IT £ ¢RES ¡3:91 ¡4:25
D £ ¢RES 1:44 ¡0:05
IT £ D £ ¢RES 2:15
N 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 415
R2 0:64 0:65 0:65 0:65 0:65 0:64 0:65 0:64 0:65
Asia: Pre-crisis
¾ER;t¡1 0:65¤¤¤ 0:63¤¤¤ 0:63¤¤¤ 0:63¤¤¤ 0:63¤¤¤ 0:65¤¤¤ 0:65¤¤¤ 0:66¤¤¤ 0:66¤¤¤
IT ¡0:18¤ ¡0:24¤ ¡0:45¤ ¡0:45¤ ¡0:45¤ ¡0:18¤ ¡0:17¤ ¡0:18¤ ¡0:18¤
RES ¡1:00 ¡1:01 ¡1:02 ¡1:02
IT £ RES 0:95 0:94 0:94
D £ RES ¡0:03 ¡0:04
IT £ D £ RES 0:21
¢RES ¡1:71 ¡1:58 ¡2:37 ¡2:47
IT £ ¢RES ¡0:87 0:09
D £ ¢RES 1:61 2:11
IT £ D £ ¢RES ¡3:45
N 367 367 367 367 367 367 367 367 367
R2 0:64 0:65 0:65 0:65 0:65 0:64 0:64 0:64 0:64
Asia: Post-crisis
¾ER;t¡1 0:50¤¤ 0:22¤ 0:22¤ 0:22 0:21 0:47¤¤¤ 0:55¤¤ 0:47¤¤ 0:52¤¤
IT ¡0:19 ¡0:34 ¡0:40 ¡0:39 ¡0:36 ¡0:17 0:01 ¡0:17 0:11
RES ¡2:46¤ ¡2:55¤ ¡2:54¤ ¡2:49
IT £ RES 0:12 0:11 0:06
D £ RES 0:02 0:02
IT £ D £ RES ¡0:38
¢RES ¡6:37 ¡3:72 ¡6:78 ¡2:34
IT £ ¢RES ¡8:71 ¡11:45
D £ ¢RES 1:03 ¡1:13
IT £ D £ ¢RES 26:23
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
R2 0:66 0:73 0:73 0:73 0:73 0:70 0:73 0:70 0:75
¤ p < 0:05; ¤¤ p < 0:01; ¤¤¤ p < 0:001; Pooled OLS estimations. Dependent variable: Exchange rate
volatility (proxied by quarterly standard deviation of daily rt|log di®erence of bilateral exchange rate
against the dollar|; IT : binary dummy, IT=1 if countries have adopted IT; RES: Foreign reserves
over GDP; D: binary dummy, D = 1 if ¢RES < 0 ; Controls not reported but included: (1) Current
account as percentage of GDP; (2) Trade openness; (3) Log of population; (4) GDP per capita; (5) VIX
index; Intercept and time controls included but not reported; We consider 2008:Q3 as the start of the
¯nancial crisis.
29Table 7: OLS coe±cient estimates from regressions of exchange rate volatility on IT
dummy and foreign reserves. Eastern Europe.
Eastern Europe: Total sample
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
¾ER;t¡1 0:36¤¤¤ 0:36¤¤¤ 0:36¤¤¤ 0:36¤¤¤ 0:36¤¤¤ 0:37¤¤¤ 0:37¤¤¤ 0:37¤¤¤ 0:37¤¤¤
IT 0:13¤¤ 0:11¤ 0:10 0:11 0:12 0:12¤¤ 0:12¤¤ 0:13¤¤ 0:12¤¤
RES ¡0:64 ¡0:65 ¡0:70 ¡0:70
IT £ RES 0:04 ¡0:04 ¡0:06
D £ RES 0:23 0:27
IT £ D £ RES ¡0:24
¢RES ¡1:46 ¡2:04 ¡1:11 ¡2:04
IT £ ¢RES 1:73 2:00
D £ ¢RES ¡0:87 ¡0:01
IT £ D £ ¢RES ¡1:41
N 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604
R2 0:36 0:36 0:36 0:36 0:36 0:36 0:36 0:36 0:36
Eastern Europe: Pre-crisis
¾ER;t¡1 0:36¤¤¤ 0:35¤¤¤ 0:35¤¤¤ 0:35¤¤¤ 0:35¤¤¤ 0:36¤¤¤ 0:36¤¤¤ 0:36¤¤¤ 0:36¤¤¤
IT 0:12¤¤ 0:09 0:09 0:11 0:13 0:11¤ 0:11¤ 0:11¤¤ 0:11¤
RES ¡0:82 ¡0:82 ¡0:87 ¡0:88
IT £ RES 0:04 ¡0:11 ¡0:16
D £ RES 0:27 0:32
IT £ D £ RES ¡0:33
¢RES ¡1:92 ¡2:91 ¡1:17 ¡2:03
IT £ ¢RES 3:45 2:92
D £ ¢RES ¡2:01 ¡2:31
IT £ D £ ¢RES 1:90
N 532 532 532 532 532 532 532 532 532
R2 0:26 0:26 0:26 0:27 0:27 0:26 0:26 0:26 0:26
Eastern Europe: Post-crisis
¾ER;t¡1 0:35¤¤¤ 0:34¤¤¤ 0:31¤ 0:31¤ 0:31¤ 0:35¤¤¤ 0:36¤¤¤ 0:35¤¤ 0:35¤¤
IT 0:19 0:16 ¡0:80 ¡0:91 ¡0:94 0:19 0:19 0:17 0:14
RES ¡0:58 ¡4:04 ¡4:30 ¡4:31
IT £ RES 4:23 4:66 4:66
D £ RES ¡0:32 ¡0:45
IT £ D £ RES 0:66
¢RES 0:11 1:68 ¡1:36 ¡0:71
IT £ ¢RES ¡3:30 ¡0:59
D £ ¢RES 3:31 3:89
IT £ D £ ¢RES ¡9:31
N 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
R2 0:53 0:53 0:54 0:54 0:54 0:53 0:53 0:53 0:53
¤ p < 0:05; ¤¤ p < 0:01; ¤¤¤ p < 0:001; Pooled OLS estimations. Dependent variable: Exchange rate
volatility (proxied by quarterly standard deviation of daily rt|log di®erence of bilateral exchange rate
against the dollar|; IT : binary dummy, IT=1 if countries have adopted IT; RES: Foreign reserves
over GDP; D: binary dummy, D = 1 if ¢RES < 0 ; Controls not reported but included: (1) Current
account as percentage of GDP; (2) Trade openness; (3) Log of population; (4) GDP per capita; (5) VIX
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